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Abstract
This article examines how justice and social order are administered and experienced 
in poor, politically fragile and conflict-affected environments. Taking notions of legal 
pluralism and public authority as our starting point, we explore how moral and social 
worlds are understood in places where ‘the law’ is not necessarily a discrete institu-
tionalised process. Drawing upon current debates in the field, as well as findings from 
the six articles in this special issue, we explore how legal pluralism and public author-
ity operate in context; how we might evaluate whether ‘justice’ is being done’; and the 
stark dissonances between local realities and the normative assumptions that cur-
rently guide international development interventions, particularly around rule-of-law 
reform and access to justice initiatives.
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1 Introduction1
How people living in the world’s most difficult places – the poorest, most politically 
fragile and conflict-affected environments – seek redress, justice and social order is 
important both for them and for the world as a whole. And yet we know remark-
ably little about everyday, lived realities in these places. There exists a gaping infor-
mation vacuum. As such, important international policies on issues such as 
expanding ‘access to justice’ or promoting the ‘rule of law’ are devised and imple-
mented on the basis of norms and assumptions rather than on evidence and care-
ful analysis. This special issue contributes to existing knowledge in this area with 
six pieces of fine-grained ethnographic research that help us understand how jus-
tice and social order are regulated in conflict-affected places that remain beyond 
the reach of institutional governance or at its margins. Our cases are mainly con-
centrated in central Africa: eastern Democractic Republic of Congo (drc), north-
ern Uganda and South Sudan. There is also an article on Timor-Leste. Unsurprisingly 
much analysis of law and justice, even when the focus is on local realities, is imbued 
with normative agendas about what law and justice should look like and also, nor-
matively driven agendas about what local realities should look like.2 The combina-
tion of the two, all these articles suggest, results in a situation in which things that 
are not really hidden from view are nevertheless not seen. This collection of articles 
is about that tension and it explores ways in which those unseen processes might 
be incorporated into analysis.
In all contexts our authors examine how the lived experience of ‘public authority’ 
relates to the provision of social accountability. ‘Public authority’ is understood here 
as the organisation of social life, at a greater level than the family, so as to allow indi-
viduals and groups to cooperate in activities.3 Just as it is everywhere, in the contexts 
under study, the existence of some form of public authority is the baseline for regu-
lated social life, including the provision of public goods such as justice and social 
1 Thank you to Rachel Ibreck, Mary Kaldor, Tom Kirk, Holly Porter, Henry Radice and Judith 
Verweijen for comments on earlier drafts of this article.
2 For an analysis of normative agendas in international policy on justice issues see T. Allen and 
A. Macdonald, ‘Post-Conflict Traditional Justice’, in G. Bruinsma and D. Weisburd (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Springer, New York, 2014) pp. 3831–3843; 
A. Macdonald, ‘From the Ground-Up: What Does the Evidence Tell Us About Local 
Experiences of Transitional Justice?’, 3:1 Transitional Justice Review (2015) pp. 72–121.
3 See O. Fjeldstad and M. Moore, ‘Revenue Authorities and Public Authority in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, 47:1 Journal of Modern African Studies (2009) pp. 1–18. For a good overview of the con-
cept of public authority and related debates, see K. Hoffmann and T. Kirk, ‘Public Authority 
and the Provision of Public Goods in Conflict-Affected and Transitioning Regions’, 7 Justice 
and Security Research Programme (2013).
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order. Below we elaborate on how this relates to existing definitions of the term and 
the power relations at play in any given situation. This takes us in a very different 
direction to debates which make a conceptual link between ‘law’ and stability and 
the idea of functioning and mal-functioning states because while public authority 
may involve state officials and formal legal procedures, it is more likely to include a 
host of other actors, including traditional chiefs, spiritual authorities, international 
aid agencies, militia leaders, entrepreneurs, age-set meetings and vigilante groups. 
At the local level, people may have recourse to normative processes that stand in 
tension with one another, for example forms of Pentecostal Christianity that openly 
reject traditional ritual practice. There are also forms of social accountability that 
incorporate local or customary notions about the allocation of personal responsibil-
ity for suffering, perhaps through the idiom of witchcraft. Other systems that are 
present may include ‘hybrids’, combining aspects of formal and informal gover-
nance institutions and norms. The aim of the issue is to discuss the lived realities of 
social accountability set in the context of a detailed empirical picture of contempo-
rary life under complex and pluralistic forms of public authority.
In this introductory article, we relate insights from the articles that follow to 
debates within the literature on legal pluralism, public authority, theories of 
justice and rule of law development, and comment upon some of the contra-
dictions and challenges that are worthy of further theoretical and empirical 
consideration. In the first section we challenge what we view as the unhelpful 
over-emphasis on European colonialism in the legal pluralism literature, which 
misleadingly suggests that societies only became legally pluralistic when the 
colonial state-building project began from the sixteenth century onwards. 
Rather than focus on understandings of legal pluralism grounded in Weberian 
notions of law, which elide legal development with the state, we re-direct 
attention to law and rules as perennial “modes of thought” and a “manner of 
imagining the real”.4 Thus, we explore how the moral world is understood in 
places where ‘the law’ is not necessarily a discrete institutionalised process, 
but rather comprises sets of rules and homilies conferred in a discretionary 
manner by a range of public authorities, from village elders to local vigilante 
groups.5 These rules comprise ‘law’ in so far as they are used to order the way 
4 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, New York, 
1983); See also H. Skoda, ‘A Historians Perspective on the Present Volume’, in P. Dresch and H. Skoda 
(eds.), Legalism: Anthropology and History (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) pp. 39–54; 
P. Dresch, ‘Legalism, Anthropology and History: A View From Part of Anthropology’, in P. Dresch and 
H. Skoda (eds.), Legalism: Anthropology and History (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) pp. 1–38.
5 Dresch, supra note 4, pp. 1–2; C. Sage and M. Woolcock, ‘Introduction’, in B. Tamanaha et al., 
Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2013) pp. 1–21.
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in which a society behaves, and yet they may not be written down; are applied 
fluidly; and often draw a great deal of legitimacy from cosmologies that cannot 
be empirically verified. Thus in any given situation, the exact constellation of 
power and of societal dynamics is, at best, “pervasively indeterminate” and 
should be understood as such.6
In the second section, we explore in more detail the idea of ‘public author-
ity’: the actual entities and institutions that mediate and regulate social order. 
All contexts under study comprise ‘hybrids’ of formal systems (institutions of 
internationally recognised governments) and informal systems based on com-
binations of patronage, kinship and religion. For hundreds of millions of peo-
ple living in fragile and conflict-affected places, the latter represents the 
prevailing form of governance and these structures need to be better under-
stood. In the third section we explore the notion of ‘justice’, and its connection 
with legal processes and what Kyed calls “order-making”.7 It is not always clear 
that ‘justice’ is the standard which laws and rules are designed to meet. Indeed 
other public goods such as ‘social harmony’ are also sought by communities as 
the paramount imperative in responding to wrongdoing or settling disputes.8 
So an important question arises around how we evaluate these processes, in 
other words, how do we form judgment about whether justice has been done? 
In the final section, we explore the often fantastical transformations that the 
international community aims to achieve in conflict-affected and fragile set-
tings and the tangential relationship between international aspirations and 
local lived realities. In doing so, we examine some of the central tenets of rule-
of-law policy and programming, including initiatives around ‘access to justice’. 
We problematise orthodox approaches in this area, but also highlight new 
directions that might offer possibilities for more genuine and equitable reform.
2 Rethinking Legal Pluralism
For most of the world’s population living in fragile or conflict-affected coun-
tries, social and political life is regulated in a multifarious domain of assorted 
6 This point was made in a speech by a senior development official to a group of experts at the 
London School of Economics (lse) in November 2014.
7 H. Kyed, State Recognition of Traditional Authority, Citizenship and State Formation in Rural 
Post War Mozambique (PhD Dissertation, Roskilde University, 2007) p. 6.
8 See H. Porter, ‘Justice and Rape on the Periphery: The Supremacy of Social Harmony in the 
Space Between Local Solutions and Formal Judicial Systems in Northern Uganda’, 6:1 Journal 
of Eastern African Studies (2012) pp. 85–86.
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and diverse rule systems and institutions – some public, some private, some 
hybrid – which enjoy varying degrees of “authority, legitimacy, coherence and 
capacity”, depending on the issue at hand.9 In the following section we explore 
what this means in practice and examine some of the tensions that arise from 
the social reality of legal and normative pluralism in the contexts under study.
“Jurisdictional complexity” is hardly a condition unique to modern times. 
Throughout history, societies have operated under “remarkable jumbles of dif-
ferent sorts of law and institutions”.10 As Brian Tamanaha argues, in the West, 
“the fact that we have tended to view law as a monopoly of the state is a testi-
mony to the success of the state-building project and the ideological views 
which supported it”, a project which began in the late medieval period.11 Thus 
perhaps too often, we associate the notion of legal pluralism with the emer-
gence of colonialism and the rapid exportation from the sixteenth to the twen-
tieth centuries of legal systems from Europe and North America to Latin 
America, Asia and Africa.12 While it is true that colonialism and the introduc-
tion of the modern, secular state may have created a very complicated and 
highly unequal legacy of legal pluralism in the contexts under study, it did not 
introduce plurality per se.13 In terms of the cases being discussed here, for 
example, we have different forms of law dictating the incorporation of popula-
tions into the central African kingdoms such as Bunyoro; the spread of Islam; 
the incursions of armies from Egypt dating back to the nineteenth century; 
and the consequences of slave raiding and invasions by pastoralist groups.
Nevertheless, when thinking about legal pluralism today, there remains a 
strong temptation to tie, conceptually, notions of law, power and the state, but 
also to view indigenous non-state law as subordinate to the official law of the 
state.14 As the articles in this volume show, different forms of law in any given 
setting, are transacted in a manner that suggest that something far more com-
plex is going on than a straight-forward desire for top-down control. Often, for 
example, law and rules are used rather vaguely and broadly by societies to make 
and re-make themselves; to draw up or substantiate social frameworks drawing 
9 Sage and Woolcock, supra note 5, p. 1.
10 B.Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’, 30 
Sydney Law Review (2007) p. 377.
11 Ibid., p. 379.
12 S.E. Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism and Legal Culture: Mapping the Terrain’, in Tamanaha et al., 
supra note 5, p. 67.
13 R. Michaels, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2009) 
p. 4.
14 Ibid., Skoda, supra note 4, p. 50.
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on their own ‘archives of moral knowledge’.15 Moreover, relationships within 
multi-centric legal and normative orders have never been static, thus, as Falk 
Moore argued in her work on Tanganika, the relationship between ‘colonial’ 
and ‘indigenous’ law was dynamic: “the paradox of directing change and pre-
serving custom means that there can be no static concept of ‘customary law’”.16 
Lauren Benton also emphasises the agency of indigenous colonial subjects in 
her argument that they were never simply the passive denizens of an imposed 
legal culture but that, across time and space, they were active in interpreting 
and making the law, and thus in shaping the international order.17 Tom Kirk’s 
article in this issue provides a vivid account of the way in which the Timorese 
have actively hybridised governance arrangements to cope with colonisation, 
occupation and, more recently, liberal state-building. He points out that some 
Timorese, “refer to such practices as ‘wrapping up’ the old in the new” in order 
to construct contemporary institutions that deal with contemporary issues.
Given that social accountability relates to basic aspects of all collective and 
individual human behaviour, it is hardly surprising that the most fervid and 
unresolved question in the legal pluralism literature has been over how exactly 
‘law’ should be defined. In the early to mid-twentieth century, anthropologists 
and anti-positivist legal philosophers observed that in colonial contexts, state 
law was often a remote factor in the normative structuring of society. Bronislav 
Malinowski’s pioneering work, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, published 
in 1926, was formative.18 As Wilson notes, “he argued that social norms in non-
state societies perform the same regulatory function as legal norms, thus 
non-codified social rules should be raised to the status of ‘law’”.19 This view 
became something of an orthodoxy among anthropologists but was soon 
under attack from a group of scholars called the ‘legal centralists’ who began 
querying the logical endpoint of legal pluralism. There was concern that by 
collapsing what they regarded to be the formally legal and the informally legal 
into one category of law, that category would be rendered meaningless. Legal 
15 See e.g., W. James, The Listening Ebony: Moral Knowledge, Religion, and Power Among the 
Uduk of Sudan (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) p. 340.
16 S.F. Moore, ‘Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers What to Say to Africans 
about Running ‘Their Own’ Native Courts’, 26:1 Law and Society Review (1992) p. 16.
17 L. Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History 1400–1900 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002).
18 B. Malinowksi, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (Rowman and Littlefield, London, 
1926).
19 R. Wilson, ‘Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human rights and Transnational 
Law’ in M. Goodale and S. E. Merry (eds.), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking the Law 
Between the Global and the Local (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) p. 346.
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centralists emphasised the importance of distinguishing norms such as social 
etiquette from formal state law, namely that the latter is drafted and enacted by 
state apparatus and backed by enforcement powers in the military and crimi-
nal justice system. Brian Tamanaha’s argument that law is a “folk concept” is 
helpful here. Having reviewed the intractable debate over how exactly ‘law’ 
should be defined, he concludes that “law is what people within social groups 
have come to see and label as law”.20
Manifestations of law within the same socio-political space may be mani-
fold and while international law, state law, customary law, and religious law 
may not all share the same “basic characteristics”, they share an important fea-
ture: they all claim “to represent legitimate authority” and are understood as 
such by those people who subscribe to them.21 As all articles in this issue 
clearly demonstrate, there are diverse ways in which societies “order a vision of 
the moral world and endow it with meaning”.22 Rules are not always necessar-
ily ‘legal’ in the sense that they represent a fixed body of law with associated 
sanctions, but they provide a “programme for living together” and a “public 
view of wrong, as distinct from private discomfort”.23 Thus, what constitutes 
‘law’ in any given context is largely an empirical question.
As has been argued above, state and non-state forms of law and normative 
practice are rarely absolute categories, incommensurate with one another. 
Lauren Benton suggests that it is more helpful to view legal pluralism “as a 
multi-jurisdictional field rather than as a structure comprising multiple 
entities”.24 People rarely see themselves as “occupying a fully separate norma-
tive order’ that is ‘in opposition to state law”.25 Depending on circumstance, 
people – and communities – move between jurisdictions and authorities.26 In 
this issue, a terminology highlighted by both Naomi Pendle in her study of 
community policing in South Sudan and by Holly Porter in her examination of 
responses to rape in Northern Uganda, is the distinction people make between 
the “home people”, “government people” and “the people of human rights” in 
the regulation of disputes. And yet, as all authors in the issue to some extent 
demonstrate, the boundaries between different jurisdictional entities: the 
20 Tamanaha, supra note 10, p. 396.
21 Ibid.
22 Skoda, supra note 4, p. 39–40.
23 Dresch, supra note 4, p. 12.
24 L. Benton, ‘Historical perspectives on legal pluralism’, in Tamanaha et al., supra note 5, 
p. 27.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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home; the church; and the state are never settled. We can, for example, observe 
a range of different interactions between even the most marginalised and vul-
nerable communities, and state law, symbols and authoritative language. In 
some cases this interaction is reminiscent of Benton’s concept of “legal postur-
ing” which, she argues, traverses jurisdictional boundaries and “flourishes in 
situations of supposed marginality”.27 As we see in this volume, whether it be 
the titweng (cattle guard) in South Sudan importing and embracing the para-
phernalia of state authority (uniforms, paychecks, new bureaucratic titles) or 
the women in northern Uganda who have been raped invoking human rights, 
despite knowing that they will probably not benefit from them, we can observe 
the different ways in which legal consciousness emerges as a result of terms 
and ideas derived from a “larger, universalising corpus”.28 Perhaps this is an 
aspirational act, an attempt to transport local life into a “broader realm of civi-
lization and rightful order”.29 And yet it is important to point out that this is 
not the same as saying that the titweng can easily be transformed into state 
adjutants or that women in Acholiland can easily be transformed into ideal-
typical, self-actualising liberal subjects.
Even in refusing to accept state law and authority or in openly resisting it, 
people are acknowledging its presence and often expressing a dissatisfaction 
with the way in which legal procedures have been (or are likely to be) polluted by 
political interference or corruption. Julian Hopwood’s study in this issue of the 
resolution of land disputes in northern Uganda provides an interesting example 
whereby even nominal state representatives in the form of local councillors 
reject formal legal processes and use locally grounded customary procedures to 
mediate between parties. Yet paradoxically, the very act of using prevalent 
notions of custom to resolve disputes gives credibility to the decisions of nomi-
nal state auxiliaries. Meanwhile, as Judith Verweijen (this issue) shows in the 
context of eastern drc, the lack of due process in formal state-led dispute resolu-
tion has arguably led citizens to “similarly disregard procedures and standards of 
evidence” when incriminating others as part of local justice processes. Thus, as 
Salwar Ismail writes in the context of modern Egypt, the state is very much alive 
in people’s imaginations and citizens “come to experience the state in the ways 
in which it does not exist for them, and not just the ways that it does”.30 This is 
27 L. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).
28 F. Pirie and J. Scheele, ‘Introduction: Law, Justice and Community’, in F. Pirie and J. Scheele 
(eds.), Legalism: Community and Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) p. 19.
29 Skoda, supra note 4, p. 3.
30 Quoted in S. J. Cooper-Knock, ‘Policing in Intimate Crowds: Moving Beyond the ‘Mob’ in 
South Africa’, 113:453 African Affairs (2014) p. 567.
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reminiscent of jb White’s argument that well defined legal categories enshrined 
in state law can “invite argument over the authority it defines”.31 Such debates 
might take place amongst intellectual elites concerned with the substantive 
nature of rights, but can also take place amongst the ‘weak’ and ‘marginalised’ in 
an effort to “articulate a claim to fairness and justice” or to assert the superiority 
of locally recognised order.32
All this begs the question: is legal pluralism something to worry about? There 
are opportunities and challenges inherent in legal pluralism in the context 
of fragile and conflict-affected places. The opportunities are quite practical in 
nature: where a state system is seen to be corrupt, inefficient or expensive, peo-
ple are able to seek redress in a range of ways via authorities, institutions and 
rule-systems which are often trusted, but also accessible and comprehensible. 
But there are also significant challenges in these contexts. Let us highlight two 
that are raised by Sage and Woolcock. First is the absence or the weak nature of 
“meta-rules”; that is to say in places where there exists a patchwork of different 
regulatory systems, there is no preponderate authority that can credibly and 
legitimately mediate between contending orders.33 In most post-colonial states, 
customary law is recognised, but there also exists a constitution with a Bill of 
Rights. Goodfellow and Lindeman make the distinction between “institutional 
hybridity” characterised by “mutual adaptation and transformation” and “insti-
tutional multiplicity” characterised by “distinct and different normative frame-
works and incentive structures”.34 They argue that in situations of institutional 
multiplicity, institutional disputes, perhaps over land or decentralisation, can 
lead to violent outcomes.35 In northern Uganda for example, confusion and con-
flict over legal rights to land has led to violent clashes between communities who 
stress their customary right to ancestral land, and government troops who are 
trying to enforce the state’s position that land which lies ‘fertile but idle’ should 
be sold to investors who have the capital to develop it.
Secondly, and linked to the above, while there is plenty of overlap between 
different legal and normative orders, these are often embedded in political 
and cosmological systems that are fundamentally ‘incongruent’, or, are ‘fluid’ 
and ‘weak’ and become ‘overwhelmed’.36 The role that ‘traditional’ justice pro-
cesses might play in broader transitional justice efforts illustrates this well and 
31 Quoted in Pirie and Scheele, supra note 28, p. 10.
32 Ibid, p. 11.
33 Sage and Woolcock, supra note 5, p. 9.
34 T. Goodfellow and S. Lindemann, ‘The Clash of Institutions: Traditional Authority and the 
Failure of “Hybridity” in Bugunda’, 51:1 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (2013) p. 7.
35 Ibid.
36 Sage and Woolcock, supra note 5, p. 9.
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highlights a disconnect between international legal and human rights norms 
and locally legitimate processes of justice, accountability and reconcilia-
tion.37 From Afghanistan to Sierra Leone, studies have highlighted the per-
sistent ethnic, religious, generational and gender hierarchies and divisions 
that complicate and limit the effectiveness of traditional practice from an 
international rights perspective. This is a point implicitly recognised in Kofi 
Annan’s observation to the United Nations Security Council that the rule of 
law and transitional justice must be “in conformity with both international 
standards and local tradition”.38 Legalist critics apply strict criteria in their 
assessment of community based justice processes and as such, institutions 
like the gacaca courts established to deal with the aftermath of the 1994 
Rwanda genocide, have come under widespread criticism for an apparent 
failure to ensure due process, including, for example, professional represen-
tation and rules of evidence.39 This sort of legalist interpretation is mis-
placed, argues Phil Clark, because ingos are wrongly interpreting gacaca as 
a “judicial institution that can be analysed through its governing legal docu-
ments”, when in fact it’s  purpose was linked to much broader societal goals 
such as truth-telling and reconciliation.40 Indeed, across sites under study in 
this special issue, the tension between different normative and legal orders 
remains unresolved, and possible unresolvable. This was recognised by a 
Ugandan minister who explained to one of the authors in 2013 that “both 
formal and traditional justice will continue to exist but in an uncomfortable 
mixture”.41
3 Public Authority and the Lived Realities of Social Accountability
In recent work in legal anthropology and ethnography, authors have directed 
our attention away from ‘institutions’ and particularly institutions of the state 
towards what Skoda calls a more “pluralist model”, one in which:
37 See Allen and Macdonald supra note 2 for a full overview of this debate.
38 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council’ (S/2004/616).
39 Human Rights Watch, Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Community-
Based Courts (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2011).
40 P. Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice 
Without Lawyers (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).
41 A. Macdonald, Justice in Transition? Transitional Justice and its Discontents in Northern 
Uganda (PhD Thesis, King’s College London, London, 2015).
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Jurisdiction is reconceptualised not as a bounded area within which legal 
authority can be exercised, but rather as the capacity to “speak the law”, 
transforming our understanding of jurisdictional entities and institu-
tions into a more subtle awareness of law as meaning, status and even 
charisma.42
As noted above, a key critique of more expansive concepts of the ‘law’ and the 
‘legal’ is that to exist as such, these categories must be clearly defined (prefer-
ably in written form) and must be able to demonstrate “public institutional-
ized enforcement of norms”.43 The problem with this argument, as Tamanaha 
points out, is that a range of different institutions enforce norms and it is 
very difficult to determine which are ‘public’ and which are not.44 Secondly, 
throughout history and in the present day, societies have operated largely with-
out institutionalised norm enforcement, despite clearly having a set of prece-
dents and ideal normative principles that circumscribe a moral and social 
order: can we really argue, as legal theorist H.L.A. Hart did in the 1960s, that 
such societies, “do not have law?”45
In the first section of this introductory article, we discussed the complex 
social reality of legal pluralism and argued that this was not a priori a good 
or bad thing, but that it carried distinctive challenges in fragile and con-
flict-affected places. In this section, we aim to conceptualise this state of 
affairs in more depth, through an analysis of the co-existing and often 
overlapping entities, institutions and authorities that exercise and oversee 
security, law enforcement, legal judgment, and criminal punishment in the 
places under study.
There are two key ways of thinking about public authority in the contexts 
under study. The tension between approaches lies in whether we understand 
extant forms of public authority as part of longer term ‘state-building’ pro-
cesses or, whether we try and understand these forms of governance as 
something qualitatively unique and unpredictable and thus as intrinsically 
important research subjects in their own right. While we certainly privilege the 
latter approach, it is important to understand scholarly developments related 
to the former. Kate Meagher has described a “paradigm shift” in the political 
science literature from “Weberian to Tillyan models” to describe processes of 
42 Dresch, supra note 4, pp. 4–5.
43 Tamanaha, supra note 10, p. 392. Tamanaha points out that both Max Weber and Adam 
Hoebel define ‘law’ in these terms.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
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state formation’.46 While we may question the linearity and robustness of such 
a shift, it is certainly the case that research over the last decade or so has chal-
lenged prevailing assumptions that in the absence of western style governance 
institutions, fragile and conflict-affected societies collapse, flounder or eek by. 
New concepts emerged, most notably “governance without government”, 
“negotiated” and “mediated” states and “hybrid political orders”.47 This was in 
reaction to the inadequacies of the ‘failed state’ discourse on African gover-
nance that predominated in the 1990s and which drew a causal link between 
insecurity, under-development and the failure of states to “fulfil their core 
functions”.48 The problem with this narrative, argued critics, was that even in 
places like Somalia and conflict-ravaged eastern drc the lack of a functioning 
state had not resulted in complete breakdown; rather some level of basic ser-
vice provision was still evident, even if it was not delivered by state authorities. 
This led to a burst of literature on hybrid forms of political authority in an 
attempt to understand the various ways in which non-state actors, ranging 
from customary authorities, to youth groups, to religious leaders, to business-
men, to militias were managing to deliver security, justice and other public 
goods in the absence of an effective state.49 The argument followed that the 
existence of multiple forms of order, even including violent vigilante groups in 
some cases, was productive rather than disastrous and may even contribute to 
longer-term state-building processes.
From a more practical perspective, these arguments have had important, 
albeit uneven, policy implications because conventional post-conflict state-
building programmes are expensive and too often unsuccessful. Also, with the 
rise of ‘resilience thinking’, donors were increasingly acknowledging that the 
world was place of “radical uncertainty” and determined, in the words of the 
United Kingdom Department for International Development (dfid) to 
“embrace uncertainty as an opportunity … to bounce back better”.50 This under-
pinned an agenda to find a more cost-effective, more culturally ‘embedded’ 
forms of governance that donors could support; perhaps, as Menkhaus 
46 K. Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States? Non-State Security Forces and Hybrid 
Governance in Africa’, 43:5 Development and Change (2012) p. 1073.
47 Ibid., p. 1074.
48 K. Hoffmann and T. Kirk, ‘Public Authority and the Provision of Public Goods in Conflict-
Affected and Transitioning Regions’, 7 Justice and Security Research Programme (2013) p. 3; 
K. Meagher et al., ‘Unravelling Public Authority: Paths of Hybrid Governance in Africa’, is 
Academy Research Brief, 10 March 2014.
49 Meagher, supra note 46, p. 1075.
50 This is quoted in M. Duffield, ‘Challenging Environments: Danger, Resilience and the Aid 
Industry’, 43:5 Security Dialogue (2010) p. 7.
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remarked, “local communities are not passive in the face of state failure and 
insecurity, but instead, adapt in a variety of ways to minimise risk and increase 
predictability in their dangerous environments”.51 As such, scholars and policy 
makers are increasingly interested in local “arrangements that work” in fragile 
areas of the world, or places where the ‘good governance’ agenda has not taken 
root – although this does remain sector specific and often involves targeting 
funding towards certain ngos specialised in ‘grassroots’ approaches.52
We are less concerned here with broader implications of current arrange-
ments on longer-term state-building prospects and more interested in under-
standing exactly what such arrangements look like in the everyday political 
economies of conflict-affected and fragile places. Several scholars undertaking 
long-term, ethnographic and qualitative fieldwork have documented such pro-
cesses empirically. In this issue, both Pendle and Verweijen show how in South 
Sudan and drc respectively, non-state or hybrid militarised groups have 
played an important – and sometimes locally legitimate – role in regulating 
social order in the name of justice. Hopwood focuses on non-militarised pub-
lic authorities in northern Uganda, but draws a similar conclusion that local 
public authorities, who often amalgamate customary, religious and statutory 
norms and practices are able to regulate land disputes in a way that challenges 
ideas that “state collapse and failure are tantamount to anarchy”.53
An important question is whether these forms of public authority are locally 
desirable or more aptly described as locally present. It was about time that 
scholars and practitioners across the spectrum acknowledged the falsifying 
representations of the ‘failed state’ discourse, which tended to define conflict-
affected and fragile places by what they lacked.54 At the same time, there is a 
risk, as Meagher points out, that rather than “overcome” the “essentialist ten-
dencies” of the previous generation of informal governance literature, we 
“invert” these tendencies: “the condemnation of non-state order as institution-
ally destructive”, she argues, “has been replaced by its celebration as a vehicle 
of embedded forms of order and authority”.55 Various scholars have put for-
ward typologies for distinguishing between what Meagher refers to as “con-
51 K. Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and 
Politics of Coping’, 31:3 International Security (2006/2007) p. 75.
52 See e.g.,, R. MacGinty and O. Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: a Critical 
Agenda for Peace’, 34:5 Third World Quarterly (2013) pp. 763–783.
53 T. Raeymakers et al., ‘State and Non-State Regulation in African Protracted Crises: 
Governance Without Government?’, 21:2 Afrika Focus (2008) p. 52.
54 Meagher, supra note 46, p. 1074.
55 Ibid.
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structive” and “corrosive” forms of non-state or hybrid order. At the heart of 
such calculations appear to be questions of legitimacy, public interest and 
broader conceptions of justice. Christian Lund, for example, highlights a vol-
untary compliance requirement and argues that in order for public authority 
to be legitimate, it must be reciprocal in nature and must be seen to be acting 
in the interests of the broader political community.56 In terms of justice provi-
sion, for example, it is argued that locally embedded forms of dispute resolu-
tion and reconciliation, normally delivered by non-state or hybrid public 
authorities provide an authentic and familiar environment through which 
popular participation can flourish. Kirk’s article in this issue on East Timor 
points to the population’s “limited knowledge of state justice institutions” and 
“heavy reliance on non-state justice institutions”. Where formal systems are 
weak, absent or compromised, attempts to sustain viable forms of public 
mutuality may be relatively peaceful. As Hopwood (this issue) shows, discord 
and disagreement over land is a product of the customary system in northern 
Uganda and “negotiation is inherent in all land occupation and use” and is 
often conducted non-violently and through community forums.
It is important here to avoid what Kimberly Theidon calls a “facile embrace 
of the local”.57 It is patently evident that public authorities and forms of hybrid 
governance can be violent, discriminatory and exclusionary. Indeed as Allen 
and Verweijen both demonstrate in this issue, vigilante executions, torture and 
mob violence are sometimes partly regarded as guarantors of ‘public goods’ 
that operate in the broader interests of community health, safety and har-
mony. Similarly Porter’s study (this issue) demonstrates clearly how judicial 
avenues of redress after rape in northern Uganda and individual justice for the 
victim are often not pursued because of broader communal concerns about 
maintaining “social harmony”. It should also be emphasised that the ‘everyday’ 
in local spaces is neither mundane, nor stable, nor uneventful. In most fragile 
and conflict-affected places, stark social deprivations and structural violence 
interfere regularly in daily life and in unpredictable ways. Drawing upon the 
work of Schmitt and Agamben some scholars have gone as far as to suggest 
that public authority, in essence, is fundamentally about defining exception 
and policing the constantly shifting boundaries between inclusion and exclu-
sion from the political community.58 Particularly striking in this issue is the 
gendered dimension that such exclusion might take. Hopwood, Kirk and Porter 
56 C. Lund, ‘Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa’, 37:4 
Development and Change (2006) p. 17.
57 K. Thiedon, ‘Editorial Note’, 3:3 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2009) p. 296.
58 Hoffman and Kirk, supra note 48, p. 15–17.
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in different ways, emphasise the gendered hierarchies that condition justice 
and accountability decisions, while Pendle and Verweijen depict a what has 
been referred in other contexts as a ‘hegemonic masculinities discourse’, a set 
of ideas and related actions that not only allows men to exercise control over 
women, but also over other men.59 It should be noted however, that these 
observations are often as relevant to the more formal and state-led judicial 
systems as they are to ‘the local’ in these contexts.
Of course local systems of social regulation and their defining characteris-
tics, such as those described above, are never in stasis. An important point 
about hybrid forms of governance and public authority in conflict-affected and 
fragile places is that these are constantly shifting entities. Hybridity is not, as 
MacGinty points out, the grafting together of two or more calcified systems of 
political order.60 His concept of “prior hybridization” highlights the ever-
adapting nature of governing systems and Pendle’s portrayal of the evolving 
and shifting nature of the titweng in South Sudan is a good example of this, as 
is Allen’s example of over-lapping and contradictory notions of accountability 
in Gulu, northern Uganda. Furthermore, as Hoffman and Kirk note, because 
public authority is influenced by the “ebb and flow of conflicts, contestations, 
competitions, negotiations and collaborative arrangements, it is never defini-
tively formed”, rather its capacity to exercise public authority is contingent on 
circumstances and even ‘field,’ such as ‘security’, or ‘justice’.61
In conceptualising such processes, Lund’s notion of ‘twilight’ institutions 
can be useful. He argues some institutions of public authority operate “in the 
twilight between the state and society, between public and private”.62 As many 
authors have noted, these institutions, or authorities, often derive legitimacy 
from their ability to communicate a “language of stateness”.63 They are, after 
all, as Migdal and Schlichte note, “doing the state” in some sense and thus 
while they exist and flourish because of it’s relative absence, they also depend 
on its chimera as an anchoring logic.64 Allen and Reid have shown in the con-
59 C. Dolan, ‘Collapsing Masculinities and Weak States – a case study of northern Uganda’, in 
F. Cleaver (ed.) Masculinity Matters: Men, Masculinities and Gender Relations in 
Development (Zed Books, London, 2003).
60 R. MacGinty, ‘Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace’, 
41:4 Security Dialogue (2010) pp. 391–412.
61 Hoffman and Kirk, supra note 48, p. 10–11; Lund, supra note 56, p. 686.
62 Lund, supra note 56, p. 686.
63 Ibid., p. 677.
64 J. Migdal and K. Schlichte, ‘Rethinking the State’, in K. Schlichte (ed.) The Dynamics of 
States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination (Ashgate Press, Aldershot, 2005) 
pp. 14–15.
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text of the Madi district of north-western Uganda, how public authorities, in 
carrying out moral cleansing, can deploy the paraphernalia of the state, includ-
ing “mimicking its procedural and symbolic forms of legitimacy”.65 Here, local 
councils helped organise “witchcraft elections” including an election commit-
tee and communitywide voting by secret ballot, culminating in “semiformal-
ized court hearings” as a means to “identify and expel those found guilty” from 
the community. Interestingly, this was described by Allen and Reid’s infor-
mants as a “reaction to the inadequacy of existing legal mechanisms to deal 
with witchcraft accusations and as an effective deterrent to anti-social behav-
ior” (those found guilty tended to be poor migrants and generally considered 
to be ‘expendable’).66 Here, echoing the election Allen describes in his article 
for this issue, it seems quite evident that informal groupings are producing 
power by drawing on recognised “symbols, rhetoric and institutional forms”, a 
pattern noted elsewhere.67 There are other instances though, when the govern-
ment itself is more closely involved in manipulating the non-state/state divide. 
Pendle, for example (this issue), shows how in South Sudan, after the 2010 elec-
tions, Sudan People’s Liberation Army elites built ‘loyal co-ethnic networks’ 
through patronage of the titweng, who in turn, would protect their personal 
wealth in the form of cattle as well as “demonstrate their personal access to 
violence if needed”.
Such concerns open up the important question of vested interests, power 
relations and connections between formal and informal modes of governance, 
including the provision of justice. Indeed, as Meagher asks, “in whose interest 
is the blurring of boundaries between formal and informal regulation, and 
what kinds of power relations underpin the shift of regulatory authority from 
formal to informal actors?”.68 Scholars do need to be more historically attuned 
and forensically attentive to the precise power relations operating in any given 
context. Unless we locate the local in the context of national and global poli-
tics, and particularly in the globalised economy we risk over-localising analysis 
and misinterpreting the evidence. Doornbos, for example, makes the impor-
tant distinction between “bottom up” systems of local order which may be 
65 R. Tapscott, The State Has Long Hands: Community Security Groups and Arbitrary 
Governance in Acholiland (forthcoming).
66 T. Allen and K. Reid, ‘Justice at the Margins: Witches, Poisoners, and Social Accountability 
in Northern Uganda’, 34:2 Medical Anthropology (2015) pp. 115–116.
67 Tapscott, supra note 65. See also D. Pratten, ‘The Thief Eats His Shame: Practice and Power 
in Nigerian Vigilantism’, 78:1 Africa (2008) pp. 64–83; L. Buur, ‘Re-Ordering Society: 
Vigilantism and Expressions of Sovereignty in Port Elizabeth’s Townships’, 37:4 
Development and Change (2008) pp. 735–757.
68 Meagher, supra note 46, p. 1077.
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genuinely embedded in local systems of social regulation and appropriate pro-
cedure, and “proxy” arrangements, in which external actors have a powerful 
vested interest in co-opting or providing additional support to certain local 
groupings in order to further their own agendas.69 Such external actors can 
range from international donors involved in peace-building programmes, to 
neighbouring states, to foreign companies to national political elites.70 Indeed 
Alex de Waal’s concept of the “political marketplace”, the idea that in many 
fragile and conflict-affected places, political regimes can be seen as “busi-
nesses, including vertically-integrated criminal cartels, which produce both 
financial profit and political power for those individuals who rise within them 
and run them”, correctly suggests that patronage politics is able to pervade 
the broader population through “militarized patrimonialism” and “identity 
politics”.71 Indeed, the power relations at play in such an analysis should 
encourage us to interrogate more closely the existence of organic and “bottom 
up” approaches to the provision of public goods in such settings.
Questions of legitimacy and accountability are highly context specific and 
while it is true that informal and hybrid public authorities cannot be described 
“apriori as inherently good or bad for political legitimacy, governance or the 
degree of popular participation in it”, scholars should continue to undertake 
the fine-grained field-based research that allows us to develop a clearer pic-
ture.72 Such efforts are also likely to uncover in more detail the appropriate-
ness of applying Tillyan models – the idea that violence is linked to effective 
state formation – to modern fragile and conflict-affected places. Leander has 
pointed to several political and historical reasons why the Tillyan model, which 
is based on an analysis of state building in pre-modern Europe is not applica-
ble to today’s African states, including globalisation and external financial 
dependence.73 There is also a flawed teleology in understanding non-state or 
hybrid forms of life as an inevitable predicator of state formation, rather than 
as a distinctive way of understanding and interpreting moral governance and 
69 M. Doornbos, ‘Researching African Statehood Dynamics: Negotiability and Its Limits’, 41:4 
Development and Change (2010) pp. 747–69.
70 Meagher, supra note 46, p. 1082.
71 A. de Waal, ‘The Political Marketplace: Developing a Framework for Addressing the Real 
Politics of Coercian and Corruption’, Seminar Note, The Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, Tufts University (2014).
72 Kirk and Hoffmann, supra note 48, p. 19.
73 Meagher, supra note 46, p. 1078; A. Leander, ‘War and the Un-Making of States: Taking 
Tilly Seriously in the Contemporary World’, in S. Guzzini and D. Jung (eds.) Copenhagen 
Peace Research: Conceptual (Routledge, London, 2004).
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social order.74 Rather than treating hybrid public authority systems as a resid-
ual to be swept aside towards ‘legitimate’ formal institutions, they should be 
researched and analysed in their own right.
4 Doing Justice?
So far we have discussed ‘law’, ‘order’ and the various authorities that mediate 
and deliver it. But what about justice? Because although justice is commonly 
associated with law, the “application of law does not always produce justice” 
for those at the receiving end.75 This can be as true of local laws and rules as it 
is of state law. The articles in this special edition indirectly add substance to 
the broader theoretical debate between liberalism and communitarianism 
that has been raging since the 1980s. In depicting various micro-level instantia-
tions of the experience of public authority (both as exercised directly by the 
State and by other authorities and institutions), and providing some assess-
ment of how ‘just’ people perceive their treatment (and that of others) to be, a 
very complicated picture emerges. Not surprisingly it challenges liberal asser-
tions that there is one vision of justice, that can be abstracted from context and 
exists as ‘universally true’, based on liberal, democratic values. It also, however, 
challenges the more communitarian position that standards of justice are 
highly context specific and depend entirely on the interpretative framework 
within which people and communities view their world.76 In all of our articles 
we see people rejecting the notion of the sovereign state applying principles of 
justice through the application of formal laws; but we also see people rejecting 
or expressing discomfort with more locally grounded efforts to regulate moral 
and social life.
What becomes apparent is the existence of a highly complex conglomerate 
of interests – ranging from the daily management of material assets, to the 
need to regulate moral order, to the need to maintain geographical and politi-
cal boundaries. Arguably the assemblage of these concerns comprises some-
thing called a ‘community’: what Etzioni famously described as “webs of social 
relations that encompass shared meanings and above all shared values”, but 
74 Dresch, supra note 4, p. 14–15
75 Pirie and Scheele, supra note 28, p. 1.
76 For an example of the communitarian position, even if they did not refer to themselves as 
‘communitarians’, see C. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985) Chapter 1; A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? (Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame, 1988).
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the idea of the ‘community’ is under-theorised in fragile and conflict-affected 
spaces, and Pirie and Scheele are right to question the assumption that com-
munities are naturally bounded: “Although terms and values may be broadly 
shared, sometimes across a wide area, they are actualised among people one 
knows”.77 As Baker and Scheye point out, in post-conflict and fragile states:
People are rarely users of either private or public agencies, as if these 
were mutually exclusive categories. In post-conflict and fragile states and 
indeed in most developing states, their choices, in as much as they have 
them, are based on ‘what is available’, ‘what works best’ and ‘what can 
I afford’, more than issues of who controls the agency and to whom they 
are accountable. People shop around for the type of security and justice 
they want.78
This perhaps over-emphasises the choices available to people in difficult set-
tings, but it allows us to depart from the more deterministic interpretations 
of justice conceptions as either ‘universally true’, or as culturally determined. 
Rather it encourages us to think about a more Sen inspired “arrangement 
focused” theory of justice, which aims to understand the “advancement or 
retreat of justice” by asking not what “perfectly just institutions” might look 
like, but rather “how would justice be advanced?” in any given context.79
There are, argues Sen, two basic and divergent approaches to thinking 
about justice. Both took shape in the enlightenment period, and continue to 
influence our reasoning today. The first is what he calls “transcendental 
institutionalism”.80 This is the approach taken by philosophers as diverse as 
Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, who were preoc-
cupied with setting out institutional arrangements that would create the most 
just society. The focus of this tradition was on “perfect justice”, and on “getting 
the institutions right”, and while much thought was given to the “requirements 
of behavioral norms” to ensure compliance, this line of inquiry focused on 
desirable rather than actual behaviors and social interactions”.81 Sen distin-
guishes between “transcendental institutionalism” and what he terms “realiza-
77 Pirie and Scheele, supra note 28, p. 14.
78 B. Baker and E. Scheye, ‘Multi-Layered Justice and Security Delivery in Post-Conflict and 
Fragile States’, 7:4 Conflict, Security and Development (2007) p. 515.
79 A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (Penguin Books, London, 2009) pp. 8–9.
80 Ibid., p. 5.
81 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
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tion based comparison”.82 The latter, he argues, was the approach taken by 
thinkers with substantive theories as diverse as Adam Smith, John Stewart 
Mill, and Karl Marx. Instead of focusing on the attainment of a transcendental 
and perfectly just society, they were interested in “societies that already existed 
or could feasibly emerge”.83 Despite the apparent relevance of such an 
approach to the legally pluralistic and hybrid societies of today’s fragile and 
conflict-affected places, it is the first approach, “transcendental institutional-
ism”, characterised as it is by a strongly positivistic trend, which shapes 
much of the scholarship and practice of contemporary development policy in 
this area.84
As the discussion above illustrates, even though there are over-arching legal 
and normative justice concepts at the international level, this does not trans-
late into “reasoned agreement on the nature of the just society”, and, moreover, 
the search for such agreement is probably elusive, or as Sen would argue, 
redundant. Indeed there exists in the literature some debate about the need 
for sounder conceptual architecture to help us understand and even ‘opera-
tionalise’ notions such as justice. Two successive United Nations Secretary-
Generals, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki Moon have referred to the need to “articulate 
a common language of justice” in their reports on transitional justice and the 
rule of law.85 Justice, however, exists as a ‘notion’ rather than a discrete goal 
and will probably never have a universal meaning. There will always be multi-
ple ‘conceptions’ of what justice is. In many places the very word ‘justice’ has 
no direct translation, and even where it does, individual and group ideas about 
what justice actually means can range from access to healthcare to the ability 
to pay school fees or for a decent burial. Geoff Dancy has written about the 
tendency of scholars, even those working from an interpretative perspective, 
to “self-reflexively’ base judgments about justice in any given context on a 
“maximalist position”, which dictates that justice “must be universal, equal and 
color blind”.86 Departing from such an approach does not amount to a call for 
82 Ibid., p. 7.
83 Ibid.
84 K. McAvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’, 
34:4 Journal of Law and Society (2007) p. 415.
85 See United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council’ (S/2004/616); 
United Nations Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council (S/2011/634).
86 G. Dancy, ‘Impact Assessment, Not Evaluation: Defining a Limited Role for Positivism 
in the Study of Transitional Justice’, 4:3 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2010) 
p. 369.
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methodological cultural relativism. It is an argument for a practical approach, 
which takes into account imperfect realities, and seeks to acknowledge, inter-
pret and reflect on the plurality of different justice-related claims and princi-
ples that exist in fragile and conflict-affected settings and how, and why, some 
arrangements are understood as just, while others are perceived as unjust.87
Let us take post-conflict northern Uganda as an example of this dilemma. 
As Julian Hopwood argues in this volume, the vast majority of people affected 
by land disputes since the closure of the displacement camps, turn to local 
leaders for mediation rather than to magistrates’ courts for adjudication. There 
are many historical and political reasons why this may be the case. Aside from 
a general lack of trust in state authorities to rule fairly and efficiently, 
Macdonald has pointed to a recurrent theme in post-conflict northern Uganda, 
which is that people grapple with the ‘generality’ of formal laws and their 
apparent universality because these properties stand in tension with the highly 
place and circumstance specific way in which rightful order is maintained.88 
Porter, in this issue and elsewhere, points to another tension which is that 
among the Acholi, the “primary moral imperative in the wake of wrongdoing is 
not punishment of the perpetrator or individual victim’s rights, but the resto-
ration of social harmony”.89 Porter describes social harmony as “a state of nor-
mal relations among the living and the dead, linked to an idea of cosmological 
equilibrium and a social balance of power and moral order”.90 Thus, in the 
context of rape, for example, the appropriate response is not dependent solely 
on the act of forced sex, but crucially on the “social role of the perpetrator”; the 
“social context” in which that act took place and the broader implications that 
punishment might have on social harmony. This does not preclude a desire for 
justice as a legal process amongst those individuals who have been wronged, 
but because social harmony is such a “highly valued ideal”, those individuals 
often express either a coerced or a willing acceptance that this type of justice 
may not materialise or will remain a secondary concern.
For the detached ‘liberal’ observer these dynamics will induce discomfort. 
There is concern that in mediating the tension between the universality of 
87 Sen, supra note 79, p. 9.
88 Macdonald, supra note 41. See also Scheele and Pirie, supra note 28. Scheele and Pirie 
point out that Aristotle and Cicero both wrote about the tension between the universality 
of the law and the peculiarity of particular cases and in ancient times, rulers were often 
judged on their ability to negotiate a fair path between the latitudinous requirements of 
general rules and the particular circumstances of individual cases.
89 Porter, supra note 8, p. 15.
90 Ibid.
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rules and the particularity of specific cases, the opportunities for manipulation 
are rife. Furthermore, there is a concern that in prioritising communal har-
mony over individual redress, those who are particularly vulnerable (such as 
the woman who has been raped), will always be denied self-actualisation. For 
supporters of a more ‘local’ justice in northern Uganda, the argument holds 
that certain leaders have a “moral jurisdiction” which confers upon them the 
discretionary power to apply the law in a way that is circumstance specific.91 
This fluidity and adaptability is understood as a great bonus.92 But if we, as 
researchers, can parachute down from the latitudinous perspectives of those 
who are for and those who are against different justice arrangements and into 
the empirical, lived reality of those who experience and negotiate different 
rules, codes of conduct and standards on a daily basis, we can begin to get a 
sense of “actual realizations and accomplishments” and of substance over 
form.93 Thus we can probably conclude that for the woman in Porter’s study 
who had been raped by her late husband’s nephew and infected by hiv aids, 
justice was not done. She wanted her relatives to contact the police, and she 
wanted the perpetrator imprisoned, but in the interests of social harmony, this 
was not done and the victim understood the constraints imposed on her by her 
environment: “no good Acholi would pursue justice alone”. On the other hand, 
for Barbara, the women studied by Hopwood, who was subject to a land dis-
pute initiated by her nephew who claimed that as a woman, she “had no rights 
to own land”, justice was probably done. Clan elders and local councillors set-
tled the case in favour of Barbara and even though her nephew refused to 
accept the decision, “all the community members” supported Barbara. Coming 
back to Sen, such divergent findings in one socio-political space should encour-
age an analysis of justice that is empirically grounded and focused not simply 
on how institutions should look and what general rules should comprise, but 
also on, “what emerges in the society, including the kinds of lives that people 
can actually lead, given the institutions and rules, but also other influences, 
including actual behavior that would inescapably affect human lives”.94
In exploring the complexity of people’s ideas and social arrangements, 
such an approach has the possibility of making significant contributions to 
91 Ibid., p. 112.
92 Martin Chanock famously wrote of the way in which the very flexibility of ‘rules’ was gave 
customary systems their ‘essence’ in the African context. See M. Chanock, Law, Custom 
and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Pearson, London, 1985).
93 Sen, supra note 79, p. 10.
94 Ibid., p. 10.
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comparative and theoretical debates about justice and authority in fragile and 
conflict-affected places.
5 Rule of Law as Theatre and Fantasy
We turn now to arguments about rule of law. Rule of law programmes are 
implemented as part of development assistance packages in every country 
under study in this issue. These programmes target the reform of state level 
arrangements, but are also designed to make customary, hybrid and local jus-
tice practices more ‘legible’ and palatable to an international audience. In 
practice as Humphrey’s has noted, they take on aspects that might be described 
as theatrical – “a morality tale about the good life”,95 and they are driven by 
fantastical normative agendas that bear little connection with the lived reali-
ties of political authority and social accountability in targeted populations. 
Based on specific ideas of what rule of law might look like grounded in 
Weberian conceptions critiqued above, the specific policies introduced might 
include funding for the training of judges; the codification of customary 
laws in line with international standards; or the ‘sensitisation’ of elders in 
fundamental freedoms that the international community promotes such as 
the rights of minorities and the rights of individuals. Along with other initia-
tives such as security sector reform (ssr) and disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration (ddr), rule of law strengthening has become a core compo-
nent of what MacGinty terms “routine peace-building”, and another element 
of the “common swirl of politically related ‘good things’ that development and 
aid agencies see as central in the promotion of liberal market democracies in 
post conflict states”.96 The ‘rule of law’ itself is a notoriously difficult concept to 
pin down. Querying the precise meaning of the term has almost become 
a scholarly sub-discipline in itself but Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s summation 
that it is “increasingly seen as the panacea for all the problems that afflict 
many non-Western countries, particularly in post-conflict settings” is apt. He 
continues:
95 S. Humphreys, Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention in Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) p. xxii.
96 R. MacGinty, ‘Routine Peace: Technocracy and Peacebuilding’, 47:3 Cooperation and 
Conflict (2012) pp. 287–308; T. Carothers and D. De Gramont, Development Aid Confronts 
Politics: The Almost Revolution (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
D.C., 2013) p. 57.
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Development experts prescribe it as the surest shortcut to market-led 
growth; human rights groups advocate the rule-of-law as the best defense 
against human rights abuses; and in the area of peace and security, the 
rule of law is considered the surest guarantee against the re-emergence 
of conflict.97
Despite the highly political nature of these outcomes, the prevailing approach 
among both development theorists and practitioners has been a paragon 
of what Kurki refers to as “depoliticised, instrumental and technical” forms of 
intervention, which rely on supplanting successful legal models across con-
texts.98 The rhetoric around rule of law policy and programming is politically 
neutralised, using the language of ‘good governance’ which is presented as 
intuitive, or ‘post-political’ and thus non-contestable. The reality is that to 
invoke the rule of law is “always to take a position on the ordering of society”, 
but its promotion also tends to “forestall political possibilities” because of 
a focus on structural and procedural reforms that often bypass legislative 
processes.99 The problem is that such interventions, or “massive social engi-
neering exercises” have, to date, been both highly costly and notably ineffec-
tive.100 State legal systems, such that they exist in all of the contexts under 
study in this volume, remain defective and non-state and hybrid systems con-
tinue to function widely and often in a way that may offend liberal sensibilities. 
There are many reasons why this might be the case. Below, we highlight two 
that are central.
Firstly, the normative structures that exist in global politics are not self- 
evidently true. Questions about why and how states adhere to them reveal 
what Schmitt famously called the “political quality of the law”.101 President 
Museveni’s quip to the audience at the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala 
about “you people” and “your love of human rights!” was disconcerting for 
observers and it is tempting to caricature his remarks as playful deviance or 
pure politicking.102 This would be misguided. As Nick Cheesman has argued, 
too often, scholars and practitioners have misconstrued the gap between 
97 B. Rajagopal, ‘Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Rebuilding: A Critical Examination’, 
49:4 William and Mary Law Review (2007) pp. 1347–1348.
98 M. Kurki, ‘Human Rights and Democracy Promotion: Reflections on the Contestation in, 
and the Politico-Economic Dynamics of, Rights Promotion’, 32:2 Third World Quarterly 
(2011) pp. 1573–1587.
99 Humphreys, supra note 95, pp. xv-xvi.
100 Sage and Woolcock, supra note 5, p. 5; Raeymakers et. al, supra note 53, p. 2.
101 C. Schmidtt, Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press, Durham, 2008) p. 30.
102 Macdonald, supra note 41.
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compliance and commitment as a gap between “principle and practice, between 
aspiration and reality”, when the issue is actually that governments in question 
are being held up to an “ideal to which they do not in fact subscribe”.103 Thus 
the difference in political arrangements is not just one of “degree” but of “kind”, 
a realisation that should “encourage a little less hubris” and more sober atten-
tion to the possibility that states and leaders who do not subscribe to the rule 
of law are not simply “occupants of low rungs on a ladder to the rule of law, 
they are climbing a different ladder altogether”.104 Indeed as de Waal argues, 
the “political marketplace is not a transitional or outdated system that is about 
to be replaced by Weberian states, but a flexible and dynamic governance 
order”.105 Thus where rule of law programmes are implemented by govern-
ments, they fail or fail to thrive in many contexts because they represent 
straightforward “isomorphic mimicry”, that is “governments and organisations 
pretend to reform by changing what policies or organisations look like rather 
than what they actually do”.106 In many situations, this leads to a bizarre 
process of structural disassociation, particularly by development officials. 
Indeed, de Waal recalls a meeting with an individual who worked for an inter-
national organisation in Somalia, who told him:
International officials in Somalia spent their office hours working on sys-
tems and procedures that they knew were a fantastical construction, and 
in the evening they secretly read the papers of political analysts to find 
out what was really going on – like clandestine users of pornography. 
Meanwhile, any Somali officials who spoke publicly about the ‘real poli-
tics’ of the country … would be treated as if they were breaking the rules 
of acceptable behavior.107
Secondly, in Humphrey’s tracing of the genealogy of the rule of law he 
points out that as classically conceived, the concept described the “norma-
tive base or legitimacy of the law in force” (emphasis added). The notion of 
the rule of law therefore derived its legitimacy from the community sub-
jected to it: the rule of law, he argues, was, “intended to express a minimal 
103 N. Cheesman, ‘Law and Order as Asymmetrical Opposites to the Rule of Law’, 6:1 Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law (2014) p. 113–114.
104 Ibid.
105 de Waal, supra note 71, p. 2.
106 M. Andrews et al., ‘Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem-Driven Iterative 
Adaptation’, 299 Centre for Global Development (2012) p. 1.
107 de Waal, supra note 71, p. 2.
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societal consensus or “deal” about “the rules of the game”.108 External 
interventions rarely acknowledge the pervasively complicated nature of 
the systems that people already use. Rather these systems are regarded as 
defective or problematic, outdated or corrupt and transformable via tech-
nical and externally devised ‘rule of law’ solutions.109 The often tokenistic 
but widespread provision for local “ownership” and “sensitization” around 
reforms “merely underlines this structural reality”.110 There is a problem-
atic assumption that function will flow from form, i.e., that what a system 
does, will flow naturally from what it looks like.111
There are, argue Caroline Sage and Michael Woolcock, who lead the 
World Bank’s Justice for the Poor programme, clear “organisational imper-
atives” in large development agencies, which combine to shape and cement 
such an approach.112 Development professionals, they argue, tend to view 
the rule of law as a “variant on other familiar technical problems” such as 
road building or crop fertilisation, which can be designed and imple-
mented by external ‘experts’ and consultants.113 Moreover, the bureau-
cratic structure of these institutions demand that certain protocols be 
followed, including project documents with measurable indicators, matri-
ces that “deftly link together aspects of social life” and a persuasive story 
about how change will happen in a given time frame of usually three to five 
years.114 None of this takes into account Geertz’s well-known call in the 
1980s for a hermeneutic approach to the study of law across cultures, rather 
than a functional one: “meaning, not machinery”, he argued, was the cate-
gory to be explored.115 There are few opportunities or career incentives for 
development professionals to engage in the anthropological, sociological 
or historical analysis that is more attuned to the “inherently relational and 
inherently contested nature of socioeconomic life”.116 Such analysis, which 
by its very nature is deeply contextual, is like to reveal something rather 
obvious: that legal orders are fundamentally about putting in place the 
rules and parameters that direct and regulate political and social relation-
ships. By extension, interventions aimed at transforming such relation-
108 Humphreys, supra note 95, p. xvii.
109 Humphreys, supra note 95; Sage and Woolcock, supra note 5.
110 Humphreys, supra note 95, p. xvii.
111 Sage and Woolcock, supra note 5, p. 5.
112 Ibid., p. 6.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Quoted in Merry, supra note 12, p. 70.
116 Sage and Woolcock, supra note 5, p. 7.
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ships via institutional reform or normative shifts threaten the existing 
status quo and as such are likely to be highly contentious. This is as true at 
the state level as it is at the most local level.
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the women in Porter’s study (this 
issue) who had been raped recognised that they had ‘rights’ because they had 
been informed of them by ngos, but did not access the services on offer 
because of the clear social norm that relatives and elders remained the “pri-
mary sources of decision making on responding to rape”. But it is not simply 
the case the people are always constrained by their social circumstances. 
Indeed Hopwood’s study of land dispute resolution in the same context points 
out that people rarely turn to courts for adjudication, and, as in other exam-
ples, women are sometimes liberated from sexually violent and neglectful 
marriages by caring in-laws and relatives. The Ugandan government’s post-
conflict strategy for the north, which is funded largely through donors, is to 
promote formal justice structures and to consolidate ‘state authority’ into the 
sub-region. This involves building more magistrates courts, more police sta-
tions, and more prisons, and all the while ‘sensitising’ the population to what 
these institutions are and how they should be used. This logic is central to 
donor support for rule of law promotion, the idea being that if judicial capaci-
ties are increased and people are ‘trained’ and ‘educated’ in what proper legal 
systems really look like, then the rule of law will be strengthened. But individu-
als and communities are not just generic ‘users’ who make decisions separable 
from their social contexts.117 Pre-existing and reified institutions concerned 
with the rule of law, such as the police and the courts, acquire meaning through 
history, and through the shared meaning systems that generate contest and 
redefine them.118 This is not to say that rule of law interventions are doomed to 
failure, rather it is to point out that these must be understood as deeply com-
plex social and political interventions, which rely on the ‘acquiesence’ and 
voluntary compliance of those they are designed to benefit.
Perhaps in loose recognition of this, traditional and indigenous processes 
are currently receiving ever more attention in both state-building and counter-
insurgency policy, while, in some contexts, putative traditional governance 
systems are being foregrounded in a manner that has not happened since the 
era of colonial indirect rule. It is believed that embedding orthodox peace-
building approaches in local culture will enhance their legitimacy and efficacy, 
117 V. Gauri et al., ‘Intersubjective Meaning and Collective Action in Developing Societies: 
Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications’, 49:1 Journal of Development Studies (2013) 
p. 116.
118 Ibid.
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thereby providing an authentic and familiar environment through which pop-
ular participation might begin to flourish. As one United Nations Development 
Programme report notes: “existence of these systems cannot be overlooked. 
We need to develop strategies to take advantage of the benefits of informal 
systems”.119 The World Bank’s 2011 World Development (wrd) Report, Conflict, 
Security and Development, marks an important step towards recognising the 
scale and complexity of the challenges of governance in difficult places. 
Ultimately though, the central message is the need to strengthen “legitimate 
institutions” in order to provide citizens with security and development. 
Although the wdr insists that such institutions need not be based on a west-
ern model, it implies that only exceptionally will they deviate. Additionally, 
although the wdr stresses that the process of building such institutions will 
require multiple moments of transition, and visually models the process as a 
spiral, it implies that progress must (and eventually will) take a unidirectional 
path. The report notes that supplementing formal justice with traditional com-
munity systems can be a “best fit”; but with a revealing caveat: “The lesson here 
appears to be to use a process of recognition and reform to draw on the capaci-
ties of traditional community structures and to ‘pull’ them gradually in the 
direction of respect for equity and international norms”.120 Selective support 
for ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ justice here provides a sort of indigenous anchor: 
a means by which the broader, donor supported agendas around transitional 
justice, access to justice and rule of law promotion can be grounded, authenti-
cated and legitimised.
It would be disingenuous to suggest that the issues identified above are not 
recognised by policy makers and practitioners as a problem. On the margins of 
mainstream development policy making there are other approaches that are 
being trialled. Kirk (this issue) points to the emergent framing of particularly 
difficult development challenges as arising from collective action problems 
that can only be addressed by citizens and governments working collabora-
tively. This approach does not expurgate a role for outsiders, instead, it recom-
mends that they abandon the preconception that elites and citizens of 
developing countries have developmental orientations hard-wired into them 
and stresses a need to understand, in detail, local political incentive structures 
to make change happen. As such, it cites the potential of outsiders to “encour-
age ‘practical hybrids’; conceived of as strategies that combine local repertoires, 
119 E. Wojkowska, Doing Justice: How Informal Systems Can Contribute (United Nations 
Development Programme, New York, 2006) p. 13.
120 World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (World Bank, 
Washington dc, 2011) p. 167.
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social norms and moral economies with imported and tested governance prac-
tices”. Kirk points to a legal empowerment programme in Timor-Leste, that was 
funded by an international ngo and was implemented largely by local legal aid 
lawyers and paralegals who were able to provide access to justice to victims of 
domestic violence. While this gave people a means of accessing justice of some 
sort, hybridity also led to unintended outcomes, including suspended sen-
tences for domestic violence following reconciliation ceremonies, that have 
the potential to be beneficial or non-beneficial on a case-by-case basis.
6 Conclusion
The conclusion that development interventions need to be more ‘context sen-
sitive’ is well worn, and so are efforts at describing how policy interventions 
that are context sensitive might be framed and put into practice. One current 
such effort is the emerging ‘doing development differently’ literature.121 
Influenced by the regrettably jargonistic term “problem-driven iterative adap-
tion” (pida), the thinking behind the approach is said to stand in “stark 
contrast” to development orthodoxies despite articulating things that most 
agencies already claim to be doing.122 The four-fold approach includes solving 
locally nominated and defined problems; creating an environment that 
encourages ‘positive deviance’ and experimentation in practice; allowing for 
“rapid experiential learning” rather than relying on ex-post ‘evaluations’; and 
finally, engaging a wide range of actors to ensure that reforms are “viable, legit-
imate, relevant and supportable”.123 There is an explicit understanding here 
that the devil will always be in the detail and that simplistic indicators and 
cross-country technical solutions are a blunt and ineffective development tool. 
Efforts are being made to apply this approach to local realities of law and jus-
tice and to give researched populations a voice. We have of course been here 
before. The World Banks’s Voices of the Poor Programme for example, began in 
the late 1990s and in 2004 one of us interviewed many World Bank officials 
about what had been learned from the programme so far. Most said that they 
were not quite sure what to do with the information and one, a leading econo-
121 See e.g., L. Wild et al., Adapting Development: Improving Services to the Poor (Overseas 
Development Institute, London, 2015).
122 M. Andrews et. al., supra note 106. For a critique, see M. Greenall, Doing Aid Differently, 
17 March 2015, <hepidreamiology.wordpress.com/2015/03/17/doing-differently/>, visited 
on 23 March 2015.
123 Andrews et. al., supra note 106.
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mist, was more explicit: he said that the World Bank had learnt that poor peo-
ple were ignorant. More recently, one of us interviewed a senior policy official 
of a large donor agency in Kampala, responsible for programming transitional 
justice funding. She complained that too much time is wasted on consultations 
with affected communities: “the problem is, we are consulting people on things 
they do not know about. Without being educated, how can they know what the 
best policy is for them?” It remains to be seen over ten years later whether 
highlighting the realities of lived experience will make much difference. The 
research programme of which the articles collected here are a part is one of 
many initiatives aimed at trying to make it so: they focus on the complexities 
of specific circumstances.124 The project now for us and others is to frame 
them in a rigorously comparative manner to fundamentally shift the terms of 
debate.
124 The Justice and Security Research Programme (jsrp) is an international research consor-
tium based in the Department of International Development at the London School of 
Economics, with funding with the uk Department for International Development (dfid). 
